Showing results 1-10 of 24.

Cases that cite: State v. Canaday

  State v. Copeland - WA

Decided: 9/19/1996

see also Daniel R. Fisher, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals: The Supreme Court Gives Federal Judges the Keys to the Gate of Admissibility of Expert Scientific Testimony, 39 S.D. L.Rev. 141, 155 (1994) (district court judges given responsibility and authority beyond the knowledge and abilities of the court in many cases). ... State's experts at the Frye hearing in this case included Dr. Bruce Weir, a professor of mathematics, statistics and genetics, Dr. Ranajit Chakraborty, a preeminent expert in statistics and human genetics, with over 20 years of study involving human DNA and genetics, Dr. Richard Gelinas, a molecular biologist, and Dr. Ellen Wijsman, a population geneticist.

Cited 101 times

  State ex rel. Collins v. SUPERIOR COURT, ETC. - AZ

Decided: 5/4/1982

We hold, therefore, that the Frye test is satisfied when the court is able to conclude that disinterested and impartial experts, knowledgeable in the scientific specialty which deals with and uses such procedures or techniques, have come to recognize the methodology as having sufficient scientific basis to produce reasonably uniform and reliable results that will contribute materially to the ascertainment of the truth. ... The court concluded that the Frye principle, adopted in Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978) (a spectrograph case), was inapplicable because the hypnosis issue did not involve expert testimony based upon a scientific procedure, but only the credibility of a witness' refreshed memory.

Cited 53 times

  State v. Martin - WA

Decided: 6/7/1984

In Frye v. 733*733 United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir.1923), the question before the court was whether an expert witness for the defendant could testify as to the result of a "systolic blood pressure deception test". ... The thrust of Frye and of the court's opinion in Canaday 734*734 is to prevent expert witnesses from testifying as to the truth of statements obtained by scientific methods unless there has been an acceptance by the scientific community of the underlying principles of the procedure.

Cited 39 times

  State v. Black - WA

Decided: 11/5/1987

Under this rule, (1) the witness must be qualified as an expert; (2) the opinion must be based upon an explanatory theory generally accepted in the scientific community, and (3) the expert testimony must be helpful to the trier of fact. State v. Allery, 101 Wn.2d 591, 596, 682 P.2d 312 (1984). ... Under circumstances such as these, an 353*353 expert witness who, in the language of ER 702, "qualifie[s] as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education," could provide the useful information to the trier of fact that, contrary to what may be expected, a rape victim may very well suppress her (or his) emotions in order to cope with the assault.

Cited 34 times

  State v. Iwakiri - ID

Decided: 5/7/1984

The hazards of such testimony are established by a formidable number of instances in the records of English and American trials."), as quoted in Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness identification, 29 Stan.L.Rev. 969-1030 (1977) (many variables affect perception of events and may result in distortion of memory). ... The defense renewed its objection against the admission of Rebecca Boyer's testimony on the grounds that: 1. the testimony had been rendered incompetent by virtue of the hypnotic trances that she had been through, 2. that her testimony had not been independently verified as is required by the State's own expert and, 3. the foundation for allowing her testimony showed that the standards for conducting the hypnosis session had not been met.

Cited 20 times

  State v. Huynh - WA

Decided: 8/31/1987

To prove that appellant vandalized the car the State presented circumstantial evidence of: (1) a thumbprint identified as appellant's which was found on the inside of the Mustang's gas filler door; (2) human, but unidentifiable smudges on the outside of the gas filler door; (3) a fingerprint expert's opinion that the location of the smudges and the the thumbprint was consistent with a right hand opening the gas filler door, implying that the print and smudges were placed on the door contemporaneously; (4) testimony by the expert regarding the weather and road conditions on the day preceding the fire when the vandalism occurred, implying that the smudges were fresh; (5) testimony and exhibits indicating that raw sugar (the brand was not identified) had been poured in the gas tank; (6) testimony that raw sugar was sold at a market where appellant had shopped on occasion located one-half block from appellant's apartment, plus a picture of a brand which was on sale at the market; ... The State's expert used a novel methodology of gas chromatography[3] to compare samples of accelerant from the fire scene to gasoline from a 2-gallon can found in appellant's car, gasoline from appellant's car, gasoline from the Mustang, and gasoline from three gas stations located near appellant's apartment, in an attempt to determine the source of the accelerant.

Cited 8 times

  State v. Fitzgerald - WA

Decided: 1/11/1985

He also argues that the effect of her opinion testimony is to tell the jury that she believes the children were truthful, invading the jury's responsibility to make credibility determinations. The State responds that Dr. Griffith is a board certified pediatrician who has worked extensively with sexually abused children, and as 657*657 an expert may testify about an ultimate issue of fact. ... The Supreme Court has adopted the Frye[2] standard, which requires that the underlying principles of an expert's opinion be generally accepted by the scientific community.

Cited 6 times

  State v. Helmer - SD

Decided: 5/17/1979

On appeal, appellant asserts pretrial error in the failure of the trial court to suppress the breathalyzer evidence and dismiss the information for two reasons: (1) That the test ampoule from the breathalyzer was not preserved for his use as exculpatory evidence; and (2) that the foundation was insufficient to admit any breathalyzer test results because the reliability of said machine has not been sufficiently established to have general acceptance in the field of blood alcohol analysis. ... In State v. Baker, 56 Wash.2d 846, 355 P.2d 806 (1960), an often-cited Washington case, that state's Supreme Court held that before the results of a breathalyzer test for determining alcohol in the blood are admissible in evidence, the state must produce prima facie evidence that:

Cited 5 times

  Eakins v. Huber - WA

Decided: 2/23/2010

¶ 11 The trial court granted Dr. Huber's motion for summary judgment, finding: (1) Dr. Adams's proffered testimony did not satisfy the Frye requirement of showing general acceptance in the medical community; (2) Dr. Adams's causation theory lacked a foundation in scientific theory, learned treatises, or testing and validation in the scientific community; and (3) Ms. Eakins failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact on the causation element of her standard of care with admissible expert testimony. ... ¶ 46 Given that medical studies do not establish a causal relationship between stainless steel stents and the types of reactions suffered by Ms. Eakins and the disagreement among medical experts in the pertinent fields of allergy and cardiology about the cause of Ms. Eakins's symptoms, we conclude no scientific consensus exists as to Dr. Adams's causation theory.

Cited 4 times


Decided: 2/4/2016
Amended: 4/12/2016

Pettis involved the same two primary psychological experts who testified in this case — Dr. Amy Phenix and Dr. Brian Abbott. ... ¶ 18 Washington applies the Frye test to gauge whether expert testimony premised on scientific evidence may be admissible.

Cited 3 times