Showing results 1-10 of 13.

Cases that cite: United States v. Kilgus

  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. -

Decided: 6/28/1993
District Court Decision: Excluded
Appellate Court Decision: Affirmed

Presumably, this relaxation of the usual requirement of firsthand knowledge—a rule which represents "a `most pervasive manifestation' of the common law insistence upon `the most reliable sources of information,' " Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Evid. 602, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 755 (citation omitted)—is premised on an assumption that the expert's opinion will have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline. ... The petition for certiorari in this case presents two questions: first, whether the rule of Frye v. United States, 54 App. D. C. 46, 293 F. 1013 (1923), remains good law after the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence; and second, if Frye remains valid, whether it requires expert scientific testimony to have been subjected to a peer review process in order to be admissible.

Cited 10616 times
Congenital disorders Developmental biology Causal inference 

  EI du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson - TX

Decided: 6/15/1995

Aside from these disagreements over the proper standard to be applied to novel scientific testimony, I believe the majority today errs in a more fundamental way: In the Court's haste to uncritically embrace Daubert, it overlooks two alternative reasons for admitting the expert testimony at issue in this case. ... He did not purport to be able to discern new insights from existing studies that other scientists had missed, as was the case in Daubert when the experts "re-analyzed" the data in existing Bendectin studies and reached opposite conclusions from the authors of the studies.

Cited 91 times

  State ex rel. Collins v. SUPERIOR COURT, ETC. - AZ

Decided: 5/4/1982

We hold, therefore, that the Frye test is satisfied when the court is able to conclude that disinterested and impartial experts, knowledgeable in the scientific specialty which deals with and uses such procedures or techniques, have come to recognize the methodology as having sufficient scientific basis to produce reasonably uniform and reliable results that will contribute materially to the ascertainment of the truth. ... The court concluded that the Frye principle, adopted in Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978) (a spectrograph case), was inapplicable because the hypnosis issue did not involve expert testimony based upon a scientific procedure, but only the credibility of a witness' refreshed memory.

Cited 53 times

  State v. Williams - ME

Decided: 7/10/1978

The controlling criteria regarding the admissibility of expert testimony, so long as the proffered expert is qualified and probative value is not substantially outweighed by the factors mentioned in Rule 403, are whether in the sound judgment of the presiding Justice the testimony to be given is relevant and will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. ... At the conclusion of the extensive preliminary testimony the presiding Justice ruled, over defendant's objection, that adequate foundation had been shown to satisfy him that (1) voiceprint identification has such scientific acceptance and reliability as warrants its admissibility in evidence, (2) the experts whose opinions were here being sought as evidence were qualified to assist the jury in its determinations.

Cited 30 times

  State v. Canaday - WA

Decided: 11/2/1978

These experts testified that retesting procedures are not scientifically reliable due to unpredictable changes in the stored chemicals and inadequacy of volume-testing techniques, and the principles used to draw conclusions based on these procedures are not generally accepted in the scientific community. ... The courts below each heard expert testimony regarding the feasibility of performing scientific tests of the contents of a used ampoule, with the goal of supporting or refuting the validity of the original test results. Retesting procedures are enthusiastically supported by some scientists.

Cited 24 times

  Brown v. State - FL

Decided: 2/8/1983

At any event, whether Frye is the rule to be applied to a new or controversial scientific technique is not one we are called upon to decide since we conclude that the method by which testimony is hypnotically induced is not one that falls within the ambit of Frye. "[T]echnically the test is not directly applicable because it is concerned with the admissibility of expert opinion deduced from the results of a scientific technique, such as a lie detector test, and not with the admissibility of eyewitness testimony." ... On the following day, just before trial, appellant's counsel sought a continuance, claiming prejudice based on the short notice of the hypnosis session, alleging that he was unable to depose the hypnotist until the day before trial and that he wished to obtain another expert for the purpose of presenting evidence concerning hypnosis in appellant's favor.

Cited 22 times

  United States v. Tranowski - 7th Circuit

Decided: 8/31/1981

The critical question is whether the district judge abused his discretion in admitting Ciupik's expert testimony, which was based on calculations made from a photograph originally used by defendant in support of his allegedly perjurious alibi testimony and a chart marking the sun's path as viewed from Chicago on the twenty-second day of each month. ... There is no question 755*755 that Ciupik was qualified as an expert in astronomy by knowledge, skill, experience and education and, as such, was eligible to express an opinion on the subject which was "beyond the ken of the ordinary layman."

Cited 12 times

  United States v. Gwaltney - 9th Circuit

Decided: 6/2/1986

We agree that as the immunobead assay has yet to gain general judicial recognition, "the proponent of such evidence has the burden of laying a proper foundation showing the underlying scientific basis and reliability of the expert's testimony." ... Gwaltney had ample opportunity to cross-examine the government's experts concerning the controls employed by Dr. Blake and to present conflicting expert testimony.

Cited 11 times

  United States v. Fleishman - 9th Circuit

Decided: 11/29/1982

United States v. Green, 548 F.2d 1261 (6th Cir. 1977) (admission of various types of expert testimony held inadmissible because it was of "both dubious relevance and cumulative.") We do not find the above cases applicable here and do not believe the district court abused its wide discretion or committed "manifest error" in admitting the Greenwood handwriting testimony. ... Combs asserts that the prejudice resulting from the limited level of certainty of Greenwood's testimony outweighed its probative value, citing to a number of cases where expert testimony was held to be inadmissible for its prejudicial impact.

Cited 9 times

  Keene Corp. v. Hall - MD

Decided: 7/1/1993

1991) (Dr. Schepers opined asbestos fibers can be invisible); Musser v. Bell Asbestos Mines, Ltd., No. 81-3929, 1986 WL 2374 (E.D.Pa. 1986) (Dr. Schepers identified as expert who told asbestos industry members in 1950s of dangers of asbestos); ... The Halls' argument that this evidence was sufficient to establish the admissibility of this use of PLM as generally accepted in the relevant scientific and medical community rests entirely on their claim that "plaintiffs' expert witnesses were better able [than defendants' expert] to comprehend and understand the process at issue and form a judgment about it."

Cited 6 times