Showing results 1-10 of 45.

Cases that cite: United States v. Amaral

  United States v. Downing - 3rd Circuit

Decided: 1/25/1985

The proffer stated that the expert would testify concerning: (1) the "forgetting curve," i.e., the fact that memory does not diminish at a uniform rate; (2) the fact that, contrary to common understanding, stress causes inaccuracy of perception and distorts one's subsequent recall; (3) the "assimilation factor," which indicates that witnesses frequently incorporate into their identifications inaccurate information gathered after the event and confused with the event; (4) the "feedback factor," which indicates that where identification witnesses discuss the case with each other they can unconsciously reinforce their individual identifications; and (5) the fact that studies demonstrate the absence of a relationship between the confidence a witness has in his or her identification and the actual accuracy of that identification.[6] ... Cf. People v. Marx, 54 Cal.App.3d 100, 111, 126 Cal.Rptr. 350, 356 (1975) (in support of its holding admitting bite mark comparison evidence, the court noted that "the basic data on which the experts based their conclusions were verifiable by the court"), cited in 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra, ¶ 702[03] at 702-20 n. 18.

Cited 387 times

  US v. Cordoba - 9th Circuit

Decided: 1/7/1997
Amended: 2/11/1997
District Court Decision: Excluded
Appellate Court Decision: Reversed/Remanded

In Daubert, the Supreme Court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 702, governing the admission of scientific expert testimony, superseded Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.Cir.1923), which had required scientific testimony to be generally accepted in the relevant scientific community to be admissible. ... The only other circuit that has squarely addressed this issue held that a per se rule excluding expert polygraph evidence was overruled by Daubert and Rule 702.

Cited 48 times

  United States v. Baller - 4th Circuit

Decided: 12/8/1975

Unless an exaggerated popular opinion of the accuracy of a particular technique makes its use prejudicial or likely to mislead the jury, it is better to admit relevant scientific evidence in the same manner as other expert testimony and allow its weight to be attacked by cross-examination and refutation. ... Although the defense did not call any expert witnesses, Baller's attorney demonstrated thorough knowledge of the subject in a detailed cross-examination that developed the possibility of error in both the general technique and the specific identification of the defendant.

Cited 42 times

  US v. Smithers - 6th Circuit

Decided: 5/8/2000
District Court Decision: Excluded
Appellate Court Decision: Reversed/Remanded

In any event, given the utility of cross-examination and jury instructions combined, it is little wonder that the vast majority of appellate cases have found the choice of these mechanisms over expert testimony, even if the expert may have some particular insight that would not be otherwise revealed, not to be an abuse of the district court's broad discretion under Kumho Tire, Daubert, and Rule 702. ... The factors listed in Daubert were meant to suggest to federal courts the relevant subjects of analysis when evaluating proffered experts under Rule 702, but they are "not holy writ" that the district court must invoke by name in order to pass our scrutiny.

Cited 35 times
Motivation Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder Social sciences Social sciences terminology Problem solving 

  United States v. Brown - 6th Circuit

Decided: 6/14/1977

In recognition of the inherent danger that expert testimony admitted without proper foundation may tend to confuse or mislead the trier of fact and thus defeat a defendant's right to a fair trial, in United States v. Green, 548 F.2d at 1268, we adopted the four criteria for reviewing a district court's decision to admit expert testimony set down in United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d at 1152. ... Appellant cites the rebuttal testimony of two expert witnesses at trial, Dr. Charles A. Evans, Senior Research Chemist at the Illinois Materials Research Laboratory who was qualified as an expert in mass spectrometry in general and ion microprobic spectrometry in particular, and Dr. Adon A. Gordus, Professor of Chemistry at the University of Michigan and an expert in trace element analysis of hair.

Cited 34 times

  United States v. Fosher - 1st Circuit

Decided: 1/15/1979

In the instant case, the trial court held that the proffered testimony would not assist the jury in determining the fact at issue; that the jury was fully capable of assessing the eyewitnesses' ability to perceive and remember, given the help of cross-examination and cautionary instructions, without the aid of expert testimony; that expert testimony would raise a substantial danger of unfair prejudice, given the aura of reliability that surrounds scientific evidence; and that the limited probative value of the proof offered was outweighed by its potential for prejudice. ... Although the offer also represented that the expert would not expound in general on the unreliability of eyewitness testimony but would rather confine his recitation to such scientific facts as limited perception given limited opportunity to observe, rate of memory decay, and the source of memory given limited opportunity to observe 383*383 followed by review of mug shots, the offer never explained how the expert's information would help the jury analyze the particular witnesses' ability to perceive and remember.

Cited 29 times

  Ibn-Tamas v. United States - DC

Decided: 10/15/1979

Appellant raises six issues on appeal: (1) the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony offered by the defense on the subject of battered women; (2) the prosecution's use, for impeachment purposes, of appellant's testimony at her first trial; (3) the prosecutor's comments to the jury about appellant's consultation with her attorney before interrogation by the police after her arrest; (4) the court's allowing the prosecution to question appellant about her beneficial interest in her husband's life insurance policies; (5) an allegedly prejudicial variance between the prosecutor's description of the case in his opening remarks and the evidence adduced at trial; and (6) the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury as to how appellant's particular physical condition should affect an evaluation of her self-defense claim. ... It is true that the state of scientific knowledge itself can be so meager in a particular field of study that courts will preclude reliance on expert testimony about it, see, e. g., Tonkovich v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 31 Wash.2d 220, 195 P.2d 638 (1948) (court took judicial notice that cause of cancer is unknown and ignored expert testimony that plaintiff's cancer resulted from on-the-job injury); but such instances merely reflect the court's conclusion that no reliable methodology for making the inquiry has been discovered; the proffer did not meet a threshold test of believability.

Cited 25 times

  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. - 9th Circuit

Decided: 12/20/1991

For the convincing reasons articulated by our sister circuits, we agree with the district court that the available animal and chemical studies, together with plaintiffs' expert reanalysis of epidemiological studies, provide insufficient foundation to allow admission of expert testimony to the effect that Bendectin caused plaintiffs' injuries. ... Moreover, whether expert opinion can satisfy this requirement is reviewed de novo by an appellate court, for "[t]he answer to the question about the reliability of a scientific technique or process does not vary according to the circumstances of each case.

Cited 19 times

  Campbell v. People - CO

Decided: 6/24/1991

Our own court of 5*5 appeals has similarly affirmed the trial court's exclusion of such evidence on two previous occasions in People v. Lawson, 37 Colo.App. 442, 445, 551 P.2d 206, 208-09 (1976), and People v. Beaver, 725 P.2d 96, 99-100 (Colo.App.1986), wherein the court of appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert's testimony because the tendered evidence on eyewitness identification was within the experience and common knowledge of the jurors. ... There, the court held that admission of the expert testimony in question was not automatic, but must survive a threshold inquiry derived from the helpfulness standard of FRE 702, id. at 1226, which provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."[9]

Cited 14 times

  US v. Amador-Galvan - 9th Circuit

Decided: 11/22/1993
District Court Decision: Excluded
Appellate Court Decision: Reversed/Remanded

The district court did not consider whether Amador-Galvan's proffered expert testimony met Daubert's requirements. ... Thus, "[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."

Cited 13 times
Law enforcement terminology