Showing results 1-4 of 4.
Cases using phrasing similar to:
"The rationale of the Frye standard is that expert testimony may be permitted to reach a trier of fact only when the reliability of the underlying scientific principles has been accepted by the scientific community."
In Frye v. 733*733 United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir.1923), the question before the court was whether an expert witness for the defendant could testify as to the result of a "systolic blood pressure deception test". ... The thrust of Frye and of the court's opinion in Canaday 734*734 is to prevent expert witnesses from testifying as to the truth of statements obtained by scientific methods unless there has been an acceptance by the scientific community of the underlying principles of the procedure.
The hazards of such testimony are established by a formidable number of instances in the records of English and American trials."), as quoted in Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness identification, 29 Stan.L.Rev. 969-1030 (1977) (many variables affect perception of events and may result in distortion of memory). ... The defense renewed its objection against the admission of Rebecca Boyer's testimony on the grounds that: 1. the testimony had been rendered incompetent by virtue of the hypnotic trances that she had been through, 2. that her testimony had not been independently verified as is required by the State's own expert and, 3. the foundation for allowing her testimony showed that the standards for conducting the hypnosis session had not been met.
To prove that appellant vandalized the car the State presented circumstantial evidence of: (1) a thumbprint identified as appellant's which was found on the inside of the Mustang's gas filler door; (2) human, but unidentifiable smudges on the outside of the gas filler door; (3) a fingerprint expert's opinion that the location of the smudges and the the thumbprint was consistent with a right hand opening the gas filler door, implying that the print and smudges were placed on the door contemporaneously; (4) testimony by the expert regarding the weather and road conditions on the day preceding the fire when the vandalism occurred, implying that the smudges were fresh; (5) testimony and exhibits indicating that raw sugar (the brand was not identified) had been poured in the gas tank; (6) testimony that raw sugar was sold at a market where appellant had shopped on occasion located one-half block from appellant's apartment, plus a picture of a brand which was on sale at the market; ... The State's expert used a novel methodology of gas chromatography to compare samples of accelerant from the fire scene to gasoline from a 2-gallon can found in appellant's car, gasoline from appellant's car, gasoline from the Mustang, and gasoline from three gas stations located near appellant's apartment, in an attempt to determine the source of the accelerant.
This is an appeal from the district court's grant of a permanent writ, which prohibits the Metropolitan Court (Metro Court) judges from conducting trials of petitioners or intervenors against whom results of any breath alcohol test are admitted, unless the State also provides each petitioner or intervenor with a separate breath alcohol sample from that same test for independent laboratory testing. ... A review of the testimony concerning the reliability of a retest of a trapped breath alcohol sample shows (a) that any trapping device is less accurate than direct breath testing, and (b) that under all testing conditions observed in Colorado, a ten to fifteen percent difference between direct test results and trapped sample test results was commonly experienced.