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Cases using phrasing similar to:
"The general test regarding the admissibility of expert testimony is whether the jury can receive "appreciable help" from such testimony."
We agree that as the immunobead assay has yet to gain general judicial recognition, "the proponent of such evidence has the burden of laying a proper foundation showing the underlying scientific basis and reliability of the expert's testimony." ... Gwaltney had ample opportunity to cross-examine the government's experts concerning the controls employed by Dr. Blake and to present conflicting expert testimony.
He cites United States v. Brawner, 153 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 471 F.2d 969 (1972) (en banc), for the proposition that where experts have meaningful information to impart, their testimony should not be blocked by requirements that unnaturally restrict communication between the expert and the jury. ... Courts have recognized, however, that because scientific or expert testimony possesses an "aura of special reliability and trustworthiness," United States v. Amaral, supra at 1152 (emphasis added), the reception of such evidence must be more limited than would be the case of similar non-expert testimony.
Despite additional psychological studies on this subject since 1973, when we held it was not reversible error to exclude such testimony in United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir.1973), this testimony is still properly excluded if it does not meet the four criteria listed in Amaral: qualified expert, proper subject, conformity to a generally accepted explanatory theory, and probative value compared to prejudicial effect. ... In Amaral, we set forth four criteria to determine the helpfulness of expert testimony: (1) qualified expert; (2) proper subject; (3) conformity to a generally accepted explanatory theory; and (4) probative value compared to prejudicial effect.