Showing results 1-3 of 3.

Cases using phrasing similar to:
"It is the responsibility of counsel during cross-examination to inquire into the witness' opportunity for observation, his capacity for observation, his attention and interest and his distraction or division of attention."

  US v. Smithers - 6th Circuit

Decided: 5/8/2000
District Court Decision: Excluded
Appellate Court Decision: Reversed/Remanded

In any event, given the utility of cross-examination and jury instructions combined, it is little wonder that the vast majority of appellate cases have found the choice of these mechanisms over expert testimony, even if the expert may have some particular insight that would not be otherwise revealed, not to be an abuse of the district court's broad discretion under Kumho Tire, Daubert, and Rule 702. ... The factors listed in Daubert were meant to suggest to federal courts the relevant subjects of analysis when evaluating proffered experts under Rule 702, but they are "not holy writ" that the district court must invoke by name in order to pass our scrutiny.

Cited 35 times
Motivation Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder Social sciences Social sciences terminology Problem solving 

  Bloodsworth v. State - MD

Decided: 9/3/1986

In Porraro, 121 R.I. 882, 404 A.2d 465, the trial court excluded testimony of a psychology professor "proffered as an expert witness on the factors that affect the reliability of eyewitness identifications" on the grounds that "it would effectively invade the province of the jury" and "that admitting this testimony would open a floodgate whereby experts would testify on every conceivable aspect of a witness' credibility." ... The Maryland test for admissibility of expert testimony was set forth for the Court by Judge Hammond in Shivers v. Carnaggio, 223 Md. 585, 165 A.2d 898 (1960):

Cited 4 times

  Bomas v. State - MD

Decided: 1/15/2010

Quoting an article published in an American Bar Association journal, Richard S. Schmechel, et al., Beyond the Ken? Testing Jurors' Understanding of Eyewitness Reliability Evidence, 46 JURIMETRICS 177, 184, Bomar defends his "presumptively admissible" theory by arguing that the standard of review for trial judges' decisions on expert testimony is "`vacuous[,]'" makes a lower court's decision "`de facto final'" or grants the lower court "unfettered" discretion, and "insulates the decision not to allow such experts within an extremely deferential standard of review." ... We granted Bomar's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to consider the following two questions: (1) should this Court reconsider its decision in Bloodsworth v. State, 307 Md. 164, 512 A.2d 1056 (1986), and adopt a standard that favors the admissibility of expert testimony on eyewitness memory identification in criminal cases where the State's primary evidence of guilt is an eyewitness identification of the accused, and (2) did the trial court improperly exercise its discretion in finding that testimony from an expert in the fields of neuropsychology and human memory would not be helpful to the jury in evaluating eyewitness identifications of the defendant?

Cited 1 times