Showing results 1-9 of 9.
Cases using phrasing similar to:
"General causation is whether a substance is capable of causing a particular injury or condition in the general population, while specific causation is whether a substance caused a particular individual's injury."
District Court Decision: Excluded
Appellate Court Decision: Affirmed
After conducting a Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), inquiry, the district court excluded both experts because they were unreliable. ... Although "[t]rained experts commonly extrapolate from existing data," neither Daubert nor the Federal Rules of Evidence "require a district court to admit opinion evidence which is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert."Medical terminology Rheumatology Autoimmune diseases Accounting terminology Breast surgery
In Daubert, the Supreme Court articulated four pertinent factors while leaving open the possibility of others: (1) whether the expert's theory "can be (and has been) tested;" (2) whether the theory "has been subjected to peer review and publication;" (3) the "known or potential rate of error;" and (4) whether the theory has "widespread acceptance." ... Finally, the court found that the expert's novel theory of causation — which the expert admitted was "the product of his own `background experience and reading'" — failed the Daubert test because it had not been tested or subjected to peer review, there was no known error rate, and it was not generally accepted.
However, in determining whether an expert's testimony is scientifically reliable, an appellate court must necessarily look beyond any magic words and look at the numerous factors that have been developed in Daubert, Robinson, and Havner. ... The trial court excluded the plaintiff's experts based on Daubert and granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
The Daubert Court listed four non-exclusive factors the trial court is to consider in determining whether an expert's testimony is based on reliable scientific knowledge: (1) whether the theory or method employed by the expert has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community; (2) whether the method has been subject to peer-review and publication; (3) whether the method employed can be and has been tested; and (4) whether the known or potential rate of error and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique are acceptable. ... Daubert and F.R.E. 702 require the trial court act as a "gatekeeper," so that the court is satisfied that the proffered expert scientific testimony meets certain standards of reliability before it is admitted.
Although the Daubert factors are not a "definitive checklist" for reliability, Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593, 113 S.Ct. 2786, "when an expert is offering testimony that is presented as a scientific conclusion and the expert's method fails to satisfy any of the factors identified in Daubert, a court should pause and take a hard look before allowing a jury to consider it." ... Daubert enumerated a list of factors that, although not constituting a "definitive checklist or test," a district court might consider in evaluating whether a proffered expert opinion has the required indicia of scientific reliability: whether a theory or technique had been and could be tested, whether it had been subjected to peer review, its error rate, and its degree of acceptance within the relevant scientific community.
Daubert enumerated a list of factors that, although not constituting a "definitive checklist or test," a district court might consider in evaluating whether a proffered expert opinion has the required indicia of scientific reliability: whether a theory or technique had been and could be tested, whether it had been subjected to peer review, its error rate, and its degree of acceptance within the relevant scientific community. ... Although the Daubert factors are not a "definitive checklist" for reliability, Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593, "when an expert is offering testimony that is presented as a scientific conclusion and the expert's method fails to satisfy any of the factors identified in Daubert, a court should pause and take a hard look before allowing a jury to consider it."
Truck Insurance Exchange v. MagneTek, Inc., 360 F.3d 1206, 1210 (10th Cir. 2004)(noting that the "trial court is afforded substantial deference in its application of Daubert [v. Merrell Dow, supra]" and "we will only disturb the trial court's decision if we have a definite and firm conviction that the lower court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances")(citations omitted). ... Based on the name of this motion — Motion to Exclude Certain Opinion Testimony of Janet N. Lemmon, Ph.D, Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 702 and Fed. R. Evid. 403 — it appears that Auto-Owners seeks to exclude Dr. Lemmon's expert testimony on the alternative basis that "its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence."
The fact that Mr. Cooper has many estimable qualifications, including in epidemiology, does not mean he can simply reiterate the expert opinions of others, a fortiori, when those opinions do not form a significant part of an independent, expert analysis Mr. Cooper applied to the facts of this case. ... Based on the current record, I conclude that the proposed expert testimony of Brendan Clark, M.D., Wendy Madigosky, M.D., and Rod Schafer satisfies the requirements of FED. R. CIV. P. 702.
I agree with Auto-Owners that Dr. Keatley and Dr. Hutchins are not qualified to present expert testimony that the motor vehicle accident at issue in this case caused her cognitive language and visual impairments and, in addition, that those opinions are not sufficiently reliable to be admissible under Rule 702 and Daubert v. Merrill Dow, supra. ... [Doc #71] Specifically, I ruled that while her conclusions were questionable, Dr. Lemmon's scientific methodology used to come to her opinions as to causation were sufficiently reliable in order to withstand my gatekeeping role under Rule 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993).