Cases using phrasing similar to:
"Indeed, differential diagnosis assumes that general causation has been proven for the list of possible causes it eliminates:"
District Court Decision: Excluded
Appellate Court Decision: Affirmed
After conducting a Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), inquiry, the district court excluded both experts because they were unreliable. ... Although "[t]rained experts commonly extrapolate from existing data," neither Daubert nor the Federal Rules of Evidence "require a district court to admit opinion evidence which is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert."Medical terminology Rheumatology Autoimmune diseases Accounting terminology Breast surgery
District Court Decision: Excluded
Appellate Court Decision: Affirmed
Following Joiner, we held that "when an expert opinion is based on data, a methodology, or studies that are simply inadequate to support the conclusions reached, Daubert and Rule 702 mandate the exclusion of that unreliable opinion testimony." ... "[W]hen an expert opinion is based on data, a methodology, or studies that are simply inadequate to support the conclusions reached, Daubert and Rule 702 mandate the exclusion of that unreliable opinion testimony."
Pursuant to Rules 702, and 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and as outlined in Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, and its progeny, Plaintiffs Zelinger and Roberts, as the proponents of the expert testimony, have failed to meet their burden of proof of establishing that the opinions of Drs. Kassan, Klapper, Hoffman, Guidoin, and Blais: (1) are based on valid, scientific principles and reliable scientific methods, processes, reasoning, and data; (2) are based upon data reasonably relied upon by experts in the field, and (3) would assist the trier of fact in resolving a factual dispute in these actions. ... Daubert sets forth several non-exhaustive factors to assist trial courts in determining whether a theory or technique constitutes "scientific knowledge" within the meaning of Rule 702, including whether the methodology, principles and reasoning underlying the proposed experts' opinions: (1) can be and have been empirically tested; (2) have been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) have a known or potential rate of error; and (4) have gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.
In Daubert, the Supreme Court articulated four pertinent factors while leaving open the possibility of others: (1) whether the expert's theory "can be (and has been) tested;" (2) whether the theory "has been subjected to peer review and publication;" (3) the "known or potential rate of error;" and (4) whether the theory has "widespread acceptance." ... Finally, the court found that the expert's novel theory of causation — which the expert admitted was "the product of his own `background experience and reading'" — failed the Daubert test because it had not been tested or subjected to peer review, there was no known error rate, and it was not generally accepted.
The Supreme Court in Daubert explained that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 allows the admission of expert testimony only if: (1) the expert is competent and qualified to testify regarding the matters that he intends to address; (2) the methodology by which the expert reaches his conclusions is sufficiently reliable; and (3) the expert, through scientific, technical or specialized expertise, provides testimony that assists the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue. ... Defendant contends that Plaintiffs' experts' testimony fails to meet the Daubert standards for admissibility because Plaintiffs' experts (1) have failed to provide any evidence, either published or unpublished, that Parlodel® increases one's risk of stroke; (2) rely on uncontrolled and unreliable spontaneous reports and anecdotal case reports as the basis for their opinions; and (3) cannot show that their opinions have an acceptable error rate or are otherwise generally accepted.
Defendant challenges the methodology employed by Plaintiffs' experts and argues their opinions have no scientific basis, are not supported by the material facts of this case, are not supported by reliable studies, have not been tested, have not been subjected to peer review, and are inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence and as explained by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) and subsequent decisions of the federal courts. ... Defendant argues these inadequacies provide a basis under Daubert to exclude the expert testimony in this case and furthermore, even if they pass scrutiny under Daubert, the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to withstand summary judgment on both general and specific causation.
Since there is no reason to believe that the "principles and methodology," Daubert I, supra, at 595, 113 S.Ct. 2786, employed in the Hueper and Autian studies were flawed, contrary studies are not a reason to preclude Lappe from relying on them. Daubert II, supra, at 1319 n. 11 (stating that Daubert does not require a majority of the scientific community to agree with the proposed expert's theory or methodology; "methods accepted by a minority ... may well be sufficient."). ... In Daubert I, the Supreme Court articulated the following factors that bear on the reliability inquiry: (1) whether the theory or technique used by the expert can be or has been tested, (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication, (3) the known or potential rate of error of the technique or theory when applied, and (4) the "general acceptance" of the theory or technique in the scientific community.
The Supreme Court in Daubert stated that Rule 702 required the district court to perform a "gate-keeping function" before admitting expert scientific testimony, to ensure that it is not only relevant, but reliable. ... "Under the Daubert standard, epidemiological studies are not necessarily required to prove causation, as long as the methodology employed by the expert in reaching his or her conclusion is sound."
Daubert thus teaches that "`the trial judge must determine whether [an expert's] opinion was grounded in the "methods and procedures of science," Daubert, [cite] and whether such testimony had sufficient `factual underpinnings.'" ... The principle of Daubert is merely that if an expert witness is to offer an opinion based on science, it must be real science, not junk science.
Whether challenging the scientific validity of expert methodologies, the general acceptance of expert opinion, or the influence of litigation, defendants repeatedly and consistently revert to what is the essence of their Daubert motions: plaintiffs' experts cannot testify that continuous infusion causes glenohumeral chondrolysis because no medical or epidemiological study conclusively says it does. ... "`[W]eaknesses in the methodology and investigation of [a] particular expert might lead the trier of fact to discount his opinions,' but `Daubert only prescribes judicial intervention for expert testimony approaching the outer boundaries of traditional scientific and technological knowledge.'"