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Cases using phrasing similar to:
"Since Daubert, moreover, parties relying on expert evidence have had notice of the exacting standards of reliability such evidence must meet."
Following in the footsteps of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), we determined in Wilt that trial courts have a gatekeeping function under Rule 702 for determining the admissibility of expert scientific testimony. ... As noted above, Daubert and Wilt provide several factors a trial court can apply to assess the reliability of expert testimony: whether the scientific theory and its conclusion can be or have been tested; whether the scientific theory has been subjected to peer review and publication; whether the scientific theory's actual or potential rate of error is known; and whether the scientific theory is generally accepted within the scientific community.
Based upon the Court's pronouncement that it would "act accordingly" if Dr. McDaniel's testimony were determined to be unreliable and the Court's subsequent determination that Dr. McDaniel's expert opinions and testimony were excludable under Daubert, Perma-Chink filed a "supplemental brief in support of motion for summary judgment of non-infringement" arguing there is no genuine issue of material 858*858 fact on the issue of non-infringement of the "improved depth of penetration" limitation in all asserted claims [see Doc. 348 at pp. 1-2]. ... Furthermore, in Pride, a case arising out of this very district, the Sixth Circuit agreed with the Honorable James H. Jarvis that a plaintiff's attempt to submit additional expert testimony was a "transparent attempt to reopen the Daubert hearing now that the weaknesses in [Pride's] expert testimony have been pointed out."
As noted above, Daubert and Wilt provide several factors a trial court can apply to assess the reliability of expert testimony: whether the scientific theory and its conclusion can be or have been tested; whether the scientific theory has been subjected to peer review and publication; whether the scientific theory's actual or potential rate of error is known; and whether the scientific theory is generally accepted within the scientific community. ... Like the instant case, in Padillas v. Stork-Gamco, Inc., 186 F.3d 412 (3rd Cir. 1999), the appellate court reviewed an order by a trial court that excluded a plaintiff's expert report under Daubert and then granted summary judgment to a defendant.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the proffered testimony of plaintiffs' expert Mr. Corpus does not meet the qualification standard set forth in Rule 702, Federal Rules of Evidence, and Daubert, for the reasons discussed herein. ... In Daubert, the United States Supreme Court interpreted Rule 702 to require district courts to be certain that expert evidence based on scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge is "not only relevant, but reliable."
The second case is Pride v. BIC Corp., 218 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2000), in which the district judge ruled on several motions submitted after the magistrate judge had issued a report and recommendation to exclude the plaintiff's expert witness testimony under Daubert and the Federal Rules of Evidence. ... Plaintiff simply seeks to correct deficiencies in Mr. Baggett's report by substituting a new handwriting expert for Mr. Baggett (see Doc. 129 at 3), whose testimony was excluded by the Court based on its determination that his qualifications and proposed expert opinion did not satisfy Daubert and the Federal Rules of Evidence.
In his motion seeking an amended scheduling order, Plaintiff characterizes Dr. Jackson as "a novice expert making her maiden voyage into the perilous Daubert waters of expert witnessing," Pl. Mem. at 2, and concludes that "in retrospect, counsel should probably not have placed Dr. Jackson, who had no prior expert witness experience, in the position of having to write a Rule 26 report on such a short time leash." ... In Summers, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the plaintiffs' motion for a new scheduling order as an abuse of discretion where the plaintiffs sought to add new expert witnesses after the court excluded two of the plaintiffs' proposed experts on Daubert grounds.
That placing sole reliance on one's expert's position is not the kind of diligence meriting a continuance seems especially the case where the party has had lengthy notice by its adversary that its expert would be challenged, see Pena v. Leombruni, 200 F.3d 1031, 1035 (7th Cir.1999) ("The plaintiffs had been on notice for months that their expert might be excluded, yet they did nothing to find a back up and thus mitigate the harm to them should he be excluded and a continuance be denied."), although it is true that a party who relies on an expert is always deemed to know of the requirements of the Federal Rules of Evidence and Daubert, see Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455, 120 S.Ct. 1011, 145 L.Ed.2d 958 (2000) ("Since Daubert ... parties relying on expert evidence have had notice of the exacting standards of reliability such evidence must meet."). ... Because the expert's methodology was flawed and his experience with the particular pesticide was lacking, the district court excluded the expert under Daubert, denied the plaintiffs' motion for a continuance to secure alternative proof on causation, and granted summary judgment for the manufacturer.
The Court recognizes that "[s]ince Daubert, . . . parties relying on expert evidence have had notice of the exacting standards of reliability such evidence must meet. ... Although the PSC and Dr. Jewell have had the benefit of the Court's prior Daubert rulings in the formulation of the new expert report, that does not create prejudice to Pfizer.