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Cases using phrasing similar to:
"Trial courts should not arrogate the jury's role in "evaluating the evidence and the credibility of expert witnesses" by "simply cho[o]s[ing] sides in [the] battle of the experts.""
Specifically, the court held in Hadden that "a psychologist's opinion that a child exhibits symptoms consistent with ... `child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome'... has not been proven by a preponderance of scientific evidence to be generally accepted by a majority of experts in psychology" and that such opinion could not be used in a prosecution for child abuse where a proper objection is raised to its introduction. ... In these consolidated appeals, James Chrisco and Carol Berry, as personal representatives of the Estate of Roy Lee Berry, Jr., deceased, appeal from a final judgment and a partial final summary judgment, respectively, which were entered after the trial court excluded the testimony of appellants' expert witnesses.
Daubert requires more, however, than a sterling resume to permit opinion testimony by a professed expert The Supreme Court, manifestly concerned with the impact on jurors of "junk science" testimony, in which "experts" provide a basis for liability by offering unorthodox opinions outside the range of generally accepted scientific theory, rightly insisted that judges serve a "gatekeeping" function, Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 n. 7 & 596, 113 S.Ct. 2786, to assess "whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid." ... To the extent that the Court found the testimony in certain respects weak or unpersuasive, that does not give the Court grounds to strike it pursuant to Rule 403 See, e.g., Jazmin Campbell, 239 F.3d at 183 ("to the extent that [defendant] asserts that there were gaps or inconsistencies in the reasoning leading to [expert witness's] opinion such arguments go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility") Indeed, such observations were surely available to the jury, and Leinen's occasionally argumentative demeanor no doubt counted against his credibility with the jury So long as Leinen provided the jury with useful information about the organizational culture of the NYPD (which he did), and was available for vigorous cross-examination to defeat the instant concerns of prejudice from isolated anecdotal evidence (which he was), the probative value of his testimony well outweighed any prejudicial effect, and it was for the jury to decide what if any weight to give to his opinions.
"Under Daubert[,] the district court functions as the gatekeeper for expert testimony." ... To the extent Dr. Rausser maintains his opinion that the alleged conspiracy began with DFA coercing Dairylea to form DMS, he must tie that alleged coercion to actual evidence of coercion and to a market share that is reasonably relied upon by experts in his field as sufficient to render coercion successful.
The Court must balance its gatekeeping role under Daubert with the Second Circuit's admonition that "[t]rial courts should not arrogate the jury's role in `evaluating the evidence and the credibility of expert witnesses' by `simply cho[o]s[ing] sides in [the] battle of the experts.'" ... The court reasoned that, because "[b]ased on his review of the literature and the case reports, [the expert] concluded that it was not necessary to control for these factors," the expert "satisfied his burden under Daubert by ... providing a reasonable explanation for dismissing specific alternate factors identified by" defendant.